The Rational Decision to Invade

                   For the realist, war is caused by situations in which large amounts power are shifted in the direction of another country or when a state has reason to believe that their security is in peril. According to Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro in their article, Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, the United States’ decision to invade Iraq was no more than a preventative course of action to avoid a shift in power towards Iraq and can be supported by a rationalist framework. Debs and Monteiro argue that the decision to invade Iraq was due to the United States’ focus on three main factors. These include the desire to prevent suspected Iraqi development of WMD, pre-existing suspicion of Iraqi intentions due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the US’s possession of ambiguous information regarding Iraq’s nuclear program. When viewing all three of these factors through the eyes of a realist, along with considering the one percent doctrine, it is almost impossible to make an argument against the decision to invade as both the physical and ontological security of the United States was at risk. These factors considered, Debs and Monteiro are completely justified in their argument that the invasion of Iraq was indeed a rational decision.

                   Due to 9/11 the nation was already in a vulnerable state and our ontological security compromised, launching a preventative war seemed the safer and more strategic option as opposed to waiting for another attack. In addition to this, the fact that United States intelligence did not have concrete evidence that Iraq did not possess WMD, makes the decision to invade highly rational. However, not all scholars share this viewpoint and feel as if the decision to start a war was highly unnecessary and irrational. Opponents to Debs and Monteiro’s argument make the valid point that Iraq in fact did not possess WMD and this so called ‘preventative’ war was launched on mistaken grounds. Opponents to this argument thus, have trouble accepting that the decision to willingly thrust our nation into a costly ten year war that was based on mistaken grounds is rational. However, in the grand scheme of things, a nation’s security is not a matter on which to tread lightly. So isn’t it better to take preventative action as opposed to waiting for something to provoke war? Debs and Monteiro argue that, “Specifically, the cost of a preventive counter-proliferation war against Iraq was expected to be orders of magnitude smaller than the expected cost of deterring, not to mention deposing a nuclear-armed Saddam” (Debs and Monteiro 2013). Therefore, all other options considered, invading Iraq appears to be more economical and grants the United States hard power over Iraq as they are acting offensively. According to Hans Morgenthau, power is defined as the control of man over man. Therefore, the potential possession of WMD increased Iraq’s potential power over the United States by having the ability to strike an attack at any moment. Similarly, the decision to invade allowed for a transfer of power back into the hands of the United States. Debs and Monteiro are correct by making the statement that the decision to invade Iraq was a rational decision as it provided the highest level of security for the United States.