Hindsight is Twenty-Twenty

            In the field of intelligence, officials are trained to identify anything out of the ordinary, whether that be noticing the absence of ‘signals’ as Nate Silver calls them in his book The Signal and the Noise, or uncovering any amount of information possible out of a jumble of competing signals. However, perhaps intelligence officers are neglecting a very important entity of possibilities, the unknown ones. As a powerful nation in the international system, we have overlooked the possibility of our own attack too many times. As Thomas Schelling states, “There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable” (Schelling). This failure to prepare for the unexpected, opens up the window for devastating attacks by outside organizations and terrorist groups. Schelling states, “When a possibility is unfamiliar to us, we do not even think about it” (Schelling), therefore putting our nation in a vulnerable position. The fact that the US is a nation of both capital and military strength may frame this false sense of security. But just because something has never happened before, does not mean that it never will as was proved by being blindsided both at Pearl Harbor and 9-11. Taking a realist perspective and realizing that power in the current international system is always up for grabs, states must realize that the motivation and likelihood of an attack is all the more realistic. Therefore no state, no matter how powerful should feel as if they are immune from attack.

            Looking back, the signs were all there in both situations that an attack was possible. The lack of radio waves from the Japanese should have been a red flag to American intelligence during WWII, and US security was aware that Al Qaeda had shifted their focus from foreign targets to the United States. So why was the US so unprepared for these attacks? Our ignorance to the threats around us can be linked to a failure of imagination. While in hindsight these red flags can be identified with much ease, these attacks were unknown unknowns, gaps in our knowledge that we didn’t even know existed. It is quite logical to assume that you are safe until your safety is threatened. In this way, it is quite expected that the US would not be prepared for an attack from a state that they technically weren’t at war with. The solution to this problem of unpreparedness then becomes not only making ourselves aware and prepared for the likely attacks, but more importantly the unlikely ones. A state’s safety in the international system is never guaranteed and therefore must be fought for every day. The only way to secure our nations safety is to expect the unexpected. “When making predictions, we need a balance between curiosity and skepticism. By knowing a little more about what we don’t know, we may get a few more predictions right” (Silver).