The Growing Conflict in Syria

Analyzing the growing troubles that plague the country of Syria it is becoming clear to many nations that the alleged atrocities that are being committed must be stopped. The level at which the international community, and for that matter who in the international community should aid, should come to the help on behalf of the Syrian people is undoubtedly up for debate. I take the position that intervention is needed in Syria but it should be done for human rights and not military, in addition the intervention force should not be solely from a state such as the United States but a joint coalition of countries.

            While many parties agree that intervention should be done with the purpose of helping the people of Syria that are being put through a Civil War, there are those who believe that military intervention from a third party is necessary. I disagree with this view for the last thing the United States needs is to be embroiled in another conflict half the world away. Looking at the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan these were decade long wars that resulted in thousands of American soldiers deaths and billions of dollars on a war that was not our own. If the United States were to be involved in another war similar to that of Iraq and Afghanistan the consequences could be dire.  While intervention in Syria for humanitarian reasons is absolutely necessary military intervention from the United States is an option that should be ruled out for the potential cost is too much. The viable option would be a joint coalition force with the goal of aiding the people of Syria. Through this option no one nation would be forced to bear the full burden of assisting a whole nation of people suffering through a tumultuous civil war.  

            It has been widely accepted that through the Syrian Civil War its innocent people are suffering. I believe the correct course of action that can aid the people of Syria without any escalation of conflict is to create a joint humanitarian effort through many of the major nations. 

Hard Power vs. Soft Power

Alexia Deleers

Every single country on this planet has wondered which way would be the best way to handle the International Relations of their country. Politicians have been torn attempting to figure out which kind of power to exert on foreign countries; hard power or soft power. Some writers will argue that hard power is crucial in International Relations because soft power shows weakness. On the other hand, many others believe the opposite. In his short book, Power: A Radical View, Lukes gives us different Dimensional Views of Power. One of the views that Lukes fails to mention is one in which hard power and soft power coexist to make a balanced way to deal with international relations.

Hard power is often exerted through military forces as well as economic force. Being within a country that exercises a great deal of hard power, many say they feel safe and looked after. In case of conflict, many States resort to using hard power to deal with their issues. In Lukes “One Dimensional View” he writes: “Conflict is assumed to be crucial in providing an experimental test of power attributions”. Numerous nations around the world believe that conflict is necessary in order to have power. They believe it is critical to experience conflicts in order to show the rest of the world what kind of power they can actually bring to the table. But in this case, I see a problem; where are the moral values that States hold? Are these to be ignored completely just to show off? Will Nations do anything in order to show off their power?

As a great deal of Nations prefer the use of hard power when dealing with International Relations, other favor soft power. The use of soft power within the world of International Relations deals with attracting people through the means of persuasion. Rather than using a military or an economy, States who favor soft power chose to put their moral values and their reason ahead of any violence. Instead of using coercion, soft power Nations will seduce foreign countries with factors that make their country seem attractive such as rights, jobs, freedom, and such things. The countries in which soft power is used prefer not to use a military force as they would rather not force anything on anyone and have people come to them by their own will. Now in this case, I see another problem; what if the soft power Nations were to get attacked? Would they be able to protect their people in the same way a hard power country could?

The Impossible Argument

            In most aspects of foreign policy, the population bases their opinions of the matter on information presented by a higher authority government. This is the direct source; government officials such as various ambassadors and the president are those who deal with other states and powers. This pathway enables the government to present information to their favor and therefore create a popular opinion of the citizens who trust elected leaders. As was the case of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the government created a perspective that immediately rallied the American people against the exact group they wanted to label as the enemy. In their article Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq, Ronald Krebbs and Jennifer Lobasz claim that the Bush administration shaped an argument for going to war with Iraq that was almost impossible to refute and therefore creating little to no opposition. This theory proposed by Krebbs and Lobasz is one that I agree with. I believe that in most cases of political decision-making, and especially those following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, information bias is the tool used by our government to implement a popular opinion in favor of what they are arguing.

            The attacks of September 11^th created a new league of terrorism in the eyes of the American people. As stated by Krebbs and Lobasz, “state power was severely attenuated, in which the threat of mass-casualty terrorism suddenly became very real.” An attack such as this seemed so formidable that going to war against the suspected perpetrators was not only an option, it was an unquestionable necessity. This perspective was largely created by the Bush administration to gain mass support for starting a war. President Bush explained to the American population after the horrendous attacks that the terrorists who calculated them were simply “evildoers.” Even the primary opposition of the Bush administration, the Democratic Party, scarcely argued against going to war with an enemy that was labeled as evil. Furthermore, because the administration labeled the struggle as a “War on Terror,” the opposition had no counter-argument to make against an enemy as inherently evil as terror. Krebbs and Lobasz analyzed the neutrality of any resistance against entering a war, stating, “…the post–9/11 War on Terror narrowed the space for sustainable political debate.” The government had painted a picture of the United States going to war with evil, to fight for the values and freedoms that were threatened. This picture tremendously helped persuade everyone, including the Democrats, that entering a war with Iraq was the only choice.

Ultimately, had these attacks not been deemed as a threat to American society and values, there might have been a larger political debate on whether war against Iraq was the right course of action. However, when fighting an enemy as arduous as evil, there is little an opposition can do to make such a war seem unjust. Because of this information, the American population, including both republicans and democrats, essentially made the unanimous decision to enter a war in Iraq, the goal of the Bush administration at the time.

The Rational Decision to Invade

                   For the realist, war is caused by situations in which large amounts power are shifted in the direction of another country or when a state has reason to believe that their security is in peril. According to Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro in their article, Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, the United States’ decision to invade Iraq was no more than a preventative course of action to avoid a shift in power towards Iraq and can be supported by a rationalist framework. Debs and Monteiro argue that the decision to invade Iraq was due to the United States’ focus on three main factors. These include the desire to prevent suspected Iraqi development of WMD, pre-existing suspicion of Iraqi intentions due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the US’s possession of ambiguous information regarding Iraq’s nuclear program. When viewing all three of these factors through the eyes of a realist, along with considering the one percent doctrine, it is almost impossible to make an argument against the decision to invade as both the physical and ontological security of the United States was at risk. These factors considered, Debs and Monteiro are completely justified in their argument that the invasion of Iraq was indeed a rational decision.

                   Due to 9/11 the nation was already in a vulnerable state and our ontological security compromised, launching a preventative war seemed the safer and more strategic option as opposed to waiting for another attack. In addition to this, the fact that United States intelligence did not have concrete evidence that Iraq did not possess WMD, makes the decision to invade highly rational. However, not all scholars share this viewpoint and feel as if the decision to start a war was highly unnecessary and irrational. Opponents to Debs and Monteiro’s argument make the valid point that Iraq in fact did not possess WMD and this so called ‘preventative’ war was launched on mistaken grounds. Opponents to this argument thus, have trouble accepting that the decision to willingly thrust our nation into a costly ten year war that was based on mistaken grounds is rational. However, in the grand scheme of things, a nation’s security is not a matter on which to tread lightly. So isn’t it better to take preventative action as opposed to waiting for something to provoke war? Debs and Monteiro argue that, “Specifically, the cost of a preventive counter-proliferation war against Iraq was expected to be orders of magnitude smaller than the expected cost of deterring, not to mention deposing a nuclear-armed Saddam” (Debs and Monteiro 2013). Therefore, all other options considered, invading Iraq appears to be more economical and grants the United States hard power over Iraq as they are acting offensively. According to Hans Morgenthau, power is defined as the control of man over man. Therefore, the potential possession of WMD increased Iraq’s potential power over the United States by having the ability to strike an attack at any moment. Similarly, the decision to invade allowed for a transfer of power back into the hands of the United States. Debs and Monteiro are correct by making the statement that the decision to invade Iraq was a rational decision as it provided the highest level of security for the United States.

Cause of the Iraq War

In a series of posts Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro engage in a discussion with David Lake over the true cause of the Iraq War. Debs and Monteiro tend to lean on the notion that the United States did not have credible information on whether or not Iraq maintained weapons of mass destruction, and therefore acted on a principle called, “One Percent Doctrine.” Meanwhile, Lake focuses on the fact that Saddam Hussein failed to give credible information to the international community that he did not posses WMD’s.  I agree with Debs and Monteiro’s perspective and that asymmetric information is a main cause of the Iraq War for if it had been known by both actors that WMD’s had no role in this conflict than the Iraq War may never have occurred.

            According to the rationalist point of view war occurs based on notions such as credible commitment, and or asymmetric information.  According to Debs and Monteiro asymmetric information is at the root cause of the Iraq War. In this case Saddam Hussein is the actor that knows his country did not maintain WMD’s, and the US is the actor that maintained different information. Had Saddam Hussein made it very aware and public that his country did not possess WMD’s the US perhaps would’ve never intervened in the Middle East; for WMD’s in the

Middle East was not acceptable to the United States and would’ve tipped the power scale. Although he denied having WMD’s he did not make it public enough to stop US intelligence from believing that he did, therefore leading to the Ira War.

            Though Lake believes that credible commitment is the true cause of the war, and that irrational factors played a crucial role. While irrational factors can undoubtedly lead to a war, in the case of Iraq and the US irrationality was not at play.  The United States still believed that Iraq maintained WMD’s and on this basis going to war in Iraq, according to US officials was crucial to maintaining peace in the Middle East.

            While both Lake and Debs and Monteiro all present notions that are absolutely the causes of war in the situation of the Iraq War asymmetric information is the most logical cause of the war. For if Saddam Hussein put all his effort into making it known that his country did not maintain WMD’s the Iraq War may would have never happened. 

The Iraq War and September 11th

Sam Feldman

The Iraq War and September 11^th

            Before Debs and Monteiro highlight possible theories about the causes of the Iraq War, they first include that no theory can provide a complete explanation of a phenomenon as complex as war.  This is completely true- however; they make several arguments linking the Iraq War to the attacks on our country on September 11^th, which is a completely misguided theory all together.

Their argument that going into Iraq was more likely following the attack on the World Trade Center is extremely irrelevant.  Just because Iraq is an Arab nation shouldn’t give us any more of a reason to go to war with them, as opposed to North Korea (as stated in the article).  Perhaps the most noteworthy counter-argument to Debs and Monteiro’s theory is that in 2006, George W. Bush, The President of the United States at the time, said publicly on national T.V that Iraq had nothing to do with the attack on 9/11.  He followed that statement by saying nobody in his administration has ever suggested that Saddam Hussein ordered the attacks.  Having this information, it seems very difficult to make a case connecting the two events.  There was barely sufficient evidence that Iraq had any significant ties with Al-Qaeda.  Let me be clear, I completely understand Debs and Monteiro’s theory that a war against Iraq was more likely after 9/11 and it even makes sense to an extent, but there’s just not enough conclusive evidence in the facts just to back the theory up.

Simply, we went into Iraq because at the time, there was a fear that weapons of mass destruction were in the hands of a madman and we felt the need to end Saddam Hussein’s power and support for injustice.  Although it turns out he didn’t have WMD’s, he did however have the capacity to make them.  We also couldn’t imagine a world with Saddam Hussein in power, as he was a threat to human lives, with all of the human suffering going on in Iraq then.

Having said that, there may be one theory I believe that could possibly link the events of September 11^th and the Iraq War that Debs and Monteiro did not mention in their article.  Since the Bush administration could not find Osama Bin Laden or anyone responsible for the attacks following 9/11, the American people were getting frustrated with the government, as we wanted an answer and retaliation for the tragedy that killed 3,000 of our citizens.  The Bush administration diverted the attention of this by invading Iraq and taking down Saddam Hussein and consequently, many American citizens would then subconsciously link the 2 events. I don’t necessarily believe this theory, but it definitely proves to be somewhat true as many Americans still either don’t know why we invaded Iraq or think that it was because Iraq was responsible for 9/11, which is clearly not the case.

Debs and Monteiro’s theory linking the attacks on our country on September 11^th and the Iraq War appears to be a common misconception.  There are several convincing facts that exhibit no clear connection between the two separate events. On the surface, there seems as if there may be a correlation, but when you dive deeper into the information, 9/11 and the Iraq War merely have nothing to do with each other.

An Examination of State Power

                  It is within our nature to polarize concepts in order to seemingly make things easier to comprehend; things are black or white, good or bad, liberal or conservative, and in the case of power, hard or soft. For some it might make sense to create a dichotomy with the ideas of power presented by Robert Dahl, but I believe that in order to properly evaluate the division of power across the globe, one must accept the idea that there exists a necessary relationship between both hard and soft power. Critics would argue that a state possesses either hard or soft power as defined by Dahl, but I think that in order to be effective a state must have hard power behind soft power, and soft power in order to be a world player.  

            Theorists such as Mearsheimer have suggested that a state’s population and level of wealth are the primary substance of power, both of which correlate with some of Dahl’s ideas of power. Hard power, as defined by Dahl, has a lot to do with one state having power over another in order to get the opposing state to act as it usually would not. And while this conception of power may satisfy a realist’s perception of how a state acquires a greater status in the world, I think it is necessary to note the accompaniment of soft power in order for a state to succeed in the world. The art of seduction is one that is not clothed in military power or simple wealth, but the “personality” of a given state. Soft power involves the art of persuasion, and as we have seen in the modern interactions of states, appearances and reputations – both of which are the premise of soft power – are powerful actors in international relations.  

            This idea is exemplified by the fact that the states which truly hold court today are not those which simply possess incredible military or economic force. States such as Germany, Russia, and North Korea all maintain a status of military power in terms of access to weaponry and potential ability to attack. However, these are not the top powers in the world. Countries such as the United States of America, China, and Great Britain possess not only the military, also considered “hard,” power of Germany, Russia, and North Korea, but also have developed a unique cultural identity which opposing states strive to adopt. For example, the Westernized culture of the United States, including its prevalence in the field of pop culture, the modern lifestyle, academic success, and idealism of the “American Dream” could all be considered elements of soft power, which other states respect and aspire towards.  The United States, and developed countries like it, is an enigma of power in the sense that they encompass both hard and soft power.

         This combination of multiple levels of power grants a state the ability to persuade and attract rather than just coerce; it means that a state can change the ambitions of other states. With that in mind, it is entirely logical to assume that a state is only a true world player when it combines a level of physical intimidation due to military and economic assets with the persuasive mechanisms of an advanced society and culture. Realists may assume that the only power necessary for achieving status as hegemony is hard power, but a more abstract review of the world reveals that hard power is only half of the equation for a state’s success in international relations. 

Soundtrack:  Power - Kanye West